Memora
Local activity capture and verifiable execution records for AI agents.
- Status
- Public SDK · release candidate
- Role
- Solo project
- Stack
- TypeScript · Node.js · Electron · signed evidence bundles · SDK · verification protocol
01Problem
Understanding an agent run means connecting its inputs, actions, file changes, and outputs. Ordinary logs can help reconstruct that story, but a copied log alone does not establish who signed it or whether the record changed afterward.
Memora separates capturing execution activity from checking the resulting evidence. A developer can inspect a session locally, export its records, and verify the signed bundle without depending on the original capture interface.
02How the public architecture is organized
The public system is split across three repositories. memora-local supplies local capture for the desktop app and CLI. memora-sdk contains the developer-facing gateway client and a separate verifier package for local sessions and portable bundles. memora-protocol defines shared record formats, canonicalization, signed envelopes, and cryptographic verification primitives.
These open-source components sit alongside closed-source hosted services. The local evidence workflow and the documented memory API are related surfaces, but a hosted demo is not a release identifier or a guarantee that every specified service behavior is deployed.
03Evidence capture and verification
The local command runner captures process lifecycle events and terminal output through a pseudo-terminal, with a plain-pipe fallback when PTY capture is unavailable. Project snapshots record file changes around the run; capture warnings and status travel with the session rather than being hidden.
Local sessions canonicalize and hash plaintext event payloads before encryption, bind ciphertext objects by hash, and sign event envelopes and a session manifest. Parent-event references provide lineage. Portable .memora bundles carry the manifest, records, and encrypted objects; selected payloads can also be disclosed for inspection.
Offline bundle verification checks manifest and event signatures, referenced records, chain consistency, ciphertext hashes, and the binding of disclosed plaintext. With the local identity, session verification can also decrypt stored payloads and compare their canonical hashes. These checks establish integrity and signer continuity, not the truth of an action or complete observation of a run.
04SDK and protocol boundaries
The gateway SDK exposes typed write, query, read, and verify operations. Its read implementation retrieves an encrypted blob, uses a challenge/signature exchange for key access, decrypts, and compares the canonical plaintext hash. The gateway client’s verify method compares an optional expected payload hash with the fetched reference and checks for a contract transaction-hash field; it does not independently verify that transaction. Offline bundle verification is a separate workflow.
The inspected SDK package is @memora-hq/memora-core 0.3.0-rc.1, with @memora-hq/memora-protocol 0.1.0-rc.2. Those package releases are distinct from the specification’s v0.1 memory model and additive v0.2 execution-lineage fields. The lineage model adds mission context, event types, and parent relationships without requiring every memory record to use them.
For the memory API, the specification names Supabase Storage as the default encrypted-blob store and IPFS/Pinata as optional. Blob storage and query metadata are separate responsibilities; neither makes a database automatically disposable or reconstructible. The specification describes per-agent bearer authentication at the public gateway and a separate challenge/signature flow for reads, with owner/delegate authorization at the key-broker boundary. These are documented service contracts, not an independent assessment of the hosted deployment.
05Engineering decisions and tradeoffs
Keeping native activity capture separate from the verifier allows evidence inspection without loading the capture stack or contacting a hosted service. A signed manifest makes missing referenced records detectable while preserving the capture status and warnings that explain what was observed.
Encrypted bundles and selective disclosure serve different inspection needs: encrypted records can be checked for integrity without exposing every payload, while disclosed content can be checked against its recorded hash. Terminal output and captured files can still contain sensitive information, so capture scope and bundle sharing require deliberate review.
The protocol also supplies Merkle-proof and TEE quote-content primitives. These are building blocks for integrations; their presence does not establish a deployed attested runtime, on-chain permission enforcement, or a particular hosted write order.
06Limitations and current scope
The public SDK is a release candidate. Local capture has explicit exclusions, file-size limits, and fallback paths; before/after snapshots do not observe every intermediate file operation. Capture status describes the recorder’s coverage, rather than proving that no activity occurred outside it.
A self-issued signing key establishes continuity with that key, not a verified real-world identity. Valid signatures and hashes do not establish execution correctness. Likewise, offline verification does not establish hosted availability, retention, recovery guarantees, or the version running behind the linked demo.